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For a New NATO-EU Bargain  
Thierry Tardy  
NATO and the European Union (EU) are 
both engaged in a continuous cycle of 
adaptation, witness in 2021 the NATO 2030 
process on the NATO side, and the Strategic 
Compass on the EU side. These two exercises 
aim to look forward to how both institutions 
can better respond to ever-changing risks and 
threats. One key dimension in this debate is 
the optimal division of tasks between NATO 
and the EU, so that what they do together and 
in a coordinated manner is bigger than what 
they do separately or in a disorderly way. 
The issue of NATO-EU cooperation is 
obviously not new and has been at the heart of 
the development of the EU’s Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since the 
late 1990s. This ties into at least three levels of 
debate that pertain to: the relationship and 
complementarity between the two 
organizations; the issue of what European 
states do within NATO; and the broader 
transatlantic bond. 
This said, twenty years of debates and inter-
institutional cooperation have fallen short of 
clarifying what the two institutions must do in 
relation to each other. Most importantly, the 
NATO-EU conundrum is hampered by a 
series of never-met objectives and pledges, as 
well as by frictions on issues such as 
duplication, overlap, European strategic 
autonomy and burden-sharing.  
Against this background, this paper takes 
stock of these unmet objectives and offers a 
broad picture of what a division of tasks 
between NATO and the EU could possibly 
look like. The analysis is intentionally bold and 
puts forward a number of proposals that are 
undeniably contentious. It nonetheless draws 
on an observation of long-term and more 
recent trends, and aims at feeding the debate 
about the future of the two main European 
security institutions and the way they can 
interlock better. 
 
LESSONS OF 20 YEARS OF NATO-EU 
PARALLEL  AGENDAS 
More than 20 years after the birth of the EU 
aspiration to play a role as a defence actor, while 
NATO has been going through a process of 
profound mutation, ten general, strategic-level, 
 
 





lessons can be empirically drawn from their parallel 
agendas.  
 
First, NATO remains the central defence guarantor for 
most of its member states, while four years of a NATO-
sceptic Trump administration have not revealed a 
particular appetite by Allies to look for alternatives to 
NATO or to the US defence guarantee. 
 
Second, NATO is a credible territorial defence 
organization; yet it can only go out-of-area (meaning out 
of Europe) at great risk to its own long-term 
effectiveness, credibility, and local acceptance, as 
illustrated by the operations in Afghanistan and Libya. 
The overall sentiment among Allies is that crisis 
management operations are no longer NATO’s main 
added-value. 
 
Third, NATO’s embrace of a Projecting Stability agenda 
in lieu of crisis management and cooperative security has 
not met with a large consensus among Allies. Nor, 
arguably, has it made the Alliance a central stabilizer of 
its periphery, as demonstrated by the persistent volatility 
in the Middle East and North Africa. 
 
Fourth, twenty years of CSDP have largely failed to 
position the EU as a credible defence actor, and there is 
little evidence that any EU member state seriously wants 
to pursue that goal. EU member states have shown little 
will to provide the forces required for the EU operations 
that they themselves voted for in the Council, and it is 
hard to conceive of a scenario of a robust military 
operation conducted through the EU and without the 
Americans. The EU is structurally and politically far 
from the ability to run Operation Unified Protector 
(Libya) or Operation Barkhane (Sahel).  
 
Fifth, if in the short term Brexit may have facilitated 
some EU achievements in the defence domain, in the 
long run the absence of the UK from the EU can only 
further undermine the latter’s aspiration to become 
militarily credible. 
 
Sixth, in the same twenty years the EU has become an 
imperfect but tangible security actor, through actions 
that lie at the nexus between security and development, 
and between internal and external security, making the 
Union an increasingly essential actor of the European 
security architecture.  
 
Seventh, the evolution of the security landscape is such 
that there are many issues and tasks that belong to the 
realm of security without necessarily having direct 
military implications. Such is the case with sanctions, 
building resilience, security sector reform, good 
governance, cyber threats, counterterrorism, civilian 
capacity-building, police training and reform, tackling 
disinformation, illegal migration, energy security, 
pandemics, etc.  
 
Eighth, over time those Western states whose strategic 
culture makes them prone to conduct high-end military 
operations have proven disillusioned by international 
organizations, which they tend to see as too constraining. 
In Europe, the practice of European defence 
increasingly conveys the message that expeditionary 
operations shall be a task for states and ad hoc coalitions 
rather than for the EU or even NATO. To a large extent, 
future high-end military operations are likely to be de-
institutionalized rather than run through international 
institutions. 
 
Ninth, twenty years of NATO-EU parallel development 
makes it difficult to discard critiques of possible overlap 
and duplication between the two institutions. Debates 
about the EU’s defence clause (while NATO has its 
Article 5), the set-up of EU planning structures, or more 
recently the controversial notion of European strategic 
autonomy (and what it would mean for NATO were it 
to be achieved), have attested to this difficulty. 
 
Finally, the process of adaptation of international security 
organizations in response to the broadening security 
agenda implies a never-ending increase of tasks, which is 
hardly sustainable, and which inevitably leads to 
maladaptation. Both the EU’s CSDP and NATO run 
 
 





the risks of dilution if they try to embrace a too large 
agenda, and there is virtue therefore in concentrating on 
a relatively narrow segment of activity. 
 
FOR A REALISTIC NATO-EU DIVISION OF 
TASKS 
I assume that these ten lessons are supported by 
sufficient empirical evidence over the last two decades of 
what NATO and the EU can and cannot do, to be 
considered structural variables of the European security 
architecture. If this is correct, then the dynamics of the 
parallel agendas of NATO and the EU and of NATO-
EU burden-sharing need to be revisited to better reflect 
these lessons. 
 
On this basis, I propose a sobering yet realist scheme for 
a NATO-EU division of tasks that takes account of the 
political frictions observed, as well as of the respective 




To start with, security actors display comparative 
advantages that theoretically determine their role in 
security management, as first or second responder, 
based on the needs of the situation. As an example, 
NATO logically was the first responder to reassure the 
Baltic states and Poland in the context of the Russian 
aggression against Ukraine in 2014, but it was not in the 
context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Similarly, the EU 
has been the first responder in civilian crisis management 
in the Western Balkans, but not whenever the use of 
force was necessary in the same region. One can find 
many examples of NATO and the EU displaying their 
comparative advantages, which leads to a possible 
division of tasks; yet this has neither been conceptualized 
nor institutionalized, mainly due to a lack of consensus 
between member states on the organizations’ respective 
roles and long-term goals.  
What I suggest is that NATO and the EU think in terms 
of first or second responder, and engage in a process of 
conceptualizing a division of tasks and its operational 
implications. By doing this, not only could the two 
organizations draw some harsh lessons from the past 
two decades, but they could also better ensure an optimal 
response to the threats out there, in contrast to what one 
currently sees, and therefore enhance their own 
credibility.  
Collective defence vs. human security 
At the centre of such a division of tasks is a bargain under 
which NATO would concentrate on collective defence 
and the EU would concentrate on a wider security 
agenda. This means that NATO would be in the lead 
(the first responder) for all collective defence-related 
activities, while the EU would be in the lead for all crisis 
management and human security-related activities, and 
each institution would come in support (as second 
responder) of the other when it is not in the lead. In such 
a deal, NATO would be a second responder in crisis 
management activities such as KFOR in Kosovo, 
Unified Protector in Libya, most maritime operations 
that do not have a collective defence component, and 
defence capacity-building in partner countries. Those 
would be the responsibility of either the EU or an ad hoc 
coalition of states (if the contemplated action would 
include the use of military force). 
Indeed, in case an emergency calls for a robust military 
operation falling outside of collective defence, it is 
assumed (and suggested) that neither NATO nor the 
EU would initially intervene; states would, in a coalition, 
as was or is the case for the first two years of ISAF in 
Afghanistan, the Coalition against ISIL, and the French-
led operation Barkhane in the Sahel. One of the lessons 
mentioned above is that the more a projected operation 
is coercive in nature, the more states become sceptical 
about the role of institutions. When it comes to war-
fighting, states are reluctant to take the institutional route 
and tend to prefer a state-centred approach. The US has 
demonstrated this inclination time and again. On a 
different scale, the French-proposed European 
Intervention Initiative provides another example of a 
 
 





preference for a de-institutionalized approach to military 
operations. This observation tends to narrow down the 
spectrum of military activities that NATO and the EU 
can be in charge of. Yet not only does it support the idea 
of an EU retrenchment from military robustness, it also 
allows NATO to concentrate on its core task of 
collective defence.  
In this scenario, NATO would still play a role in 
projecting stability (and could even make it a core task, 
probably under a different name, in a revised Strategic 
Concept), but with the assumption that it would do that 
in support of the EU or other security actors. The Alliance 
would also keep its prerogatives in the nuclear deterrence 
(and nuclear sharing) domain, which no country is 
willing to transfer to the EU anyway.  
Likewise, the EU would, at least temporarily, give up on 
collective defence and high-end military operations; it 
would continue to develop capabilities in the framework 
of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) 
and the European Defence Fund (EDF), with the 
assumption that such capabilities would be resorted to 
either by the EU or by a coalition of EU member states 
in a crisis management scenario (in an operation such as 
KFOR, for example), or by NATO itself. EU-led crisis 
management would thus come in support of NATO in 
an Article 5 scenario, while NATO would come in 
support of the EU in any large-scale complex emergency 
that is not Article 5-related.  
This does not imply that the EU would no longer aspire 
to become strategically autonomous, which the wider 
security agenda no doubt calls for. It rather signifies a 
shift in the meaning of autonomy, and puts its military 
dimension in the hands of the (European) states rather 
than the EU as such, at least for the coming years. For 
European states that want to pursue the strategic 
autonomy objective, starting by developing a European 
“warfighting culture” outside of the EU is not necessarily 
a bad idea, especially if it allows the UK to be part of the 
game (and to demonstrate, outside of the EU, how it can 
work). Once some of the pillars of autonomy and 
robustness are established by European states, a process 
of re-institutionalization is possible, as the need for an 
EU foreign policy approach will remain. 
Geography 
The further NATO and the EU operate from their base, 
the more challenging operations are both in political and 
operational terms. Furthermore, the defence/security 
agenda in the vicinity of Europe is complex and unstable. 
It follows that it makes sense for the two organizations 
to concentrate on their own periphery, and to intervene 
beyond it only in support of others or exceptionally. This 
of course does not mean that EU or NATO members 
are absent from the international arena, but rather that 
they intervene there outside of the EU or NATO. 
NATO’s area of responsibility is the one defined by 
Article 6 of the Washington Treaty in its collective 
defence role, and I argue that the Alliance should 
intervene as second responder outside of this area. As 
for the EU, its wide security agenda implies a role within 
EU territory as well as in its periphery, but it should 
refrain from intervening beyond its broad 
neighbourhood. In this context, whether CSDP should 
also cover internal security issues needs to be thoroughly 
examined, as some PESCO projects (such as Military 
Mobility or the various cyber security projects) already 
suggest, and as the broad civilian crisis management 
agenda (implying CSDP, but also the European 
Commission and Justice and Home Affairs agencies) 
calls for. 
Sequencing 
A sound division of tasks calls for some sort of 
sequencing between various security actors, especially 
when a military operation is being considered. This is 
implied by all concepts of rapid reaction as well as by the 
security-development nexus: a situation may require an 
initial robust intervention before a different set of actors 
takes over for longer-term stabilization activities. Applied 
to NATO-EU cooperation, outside of collective 
defence scenarios (in which NATO would be involved 
 
 





from the beginning), the sequencing could only start 
with an ad hoc coalition that may, in due course, hand 
over to other actors, including the EU that may take the 
lead of stabilization efforts (as first responder), with the 
support of NATO (as second responder). Here again, 
what security actors do best drives the division of tasks. 
CONCLUSION: THE VIRTUES OF THE NATO-
EU DEAL 
Over the last 20 years, NATO and the European Union 
have largely failed to design an effective division of 
labour. What we have seen instead is a mix of political 
frictions, unmet pledges, and frustrations on the part of 
the states that are at the forefront of security governance 
in the Euro-Atlantic area, in particular the US and 
France. What this paper has argued is that NATO allies 
and EU member states must agree on a new bargain that 
would clarify the division of tasks, set more realist 
objectives, and better ensure the relevance and credibility 
of the two organizations.  
According to this bargain, NATO primarily does 
collective defence and comes in support of the EU for 
activities for which it is not the first responder. The EU 
embraces a broad (human) security agenda and 
continues to support member states’ capability 
development, but does not pursue, at least for some 
time, a stricto sensu defence operational role; European 
states do.  
Were the two organizations to follow what is suggested 
here, quite a few issues would still hamper the 
partnership, and many sources of friction would 
probably remain. However, clarity on what NATO and 
the EU do would allow for: (1) an increased credibility of 
NATO, which would concentrate on its core collective 
defence task; (2) an increased credibility of and 
consensus within the European Union, which would 
concentrate on the human security and resilience-
building agenda and put temporarily an end to the 
ambition of EU defence actorness, which only states can 
probably acquire in the current environment, before the 
EU hypothetically takes over after a transition period; (3) 
strengthened Transatlantic relations, as a result of a 
clearer division of tasks between NATO and the EU 
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